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Abstract: Technological realities limit terrestrial quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) to single-link distances of a few hundred kilometers. One
promising avenue for global-scale quantum communication networks is
to use low-Earth-orbit satellites. Here we report the first demonstration of
QKD from a stationary transmitter to a receiver platform traveling at an
angular speed equivalent to a 600km altitude satellite, located on a moving
truck. We overcome the challenges of actively correcting beam pointing,
photon polarization and time-of-flight. Our system generates an asymptotic
secure key at 40bits/s.
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1. Introduction
Contemporary communications security relies on assumptions about an adversary’s computa-
tional ability, a property that is uncontrolled and can rapidly change. In contrast, quantum key
distribution (QKD) provides a mechanism to establish future-proof secure communications be-
tween two parties by exploiting fundamental quantum mechanics to generate a secret, random
encryption key common to both parties [1]. While commercial application of this technology
is growing, with current technology direct QKD links on the ground cannot reach distances
beyond a few hundred kilometers due to optical losses [2–6]. Quantum repeaters [7,8] promise
to be an essential component of future long-distance QKD networks, but such devices are not
ready for operational integration [9, 10]. Alternatively, an orbiting satellite could serve as an
untrusted node [11, 12]—linking two ground stations simultaneously and facilitating key dis-
tribution without acquiring the key itself—or as trusted node [13–21]—exchanging individual
keys with each ground station and broadcasting the combination of two keys to allow two
ground stations to establish a shared key. Although the satellite is privy to the keys, by requir-
ing only one link at a time the trusted node satellite benefits from a simpler design and, with a
suitable orbit, allows key distribution between two parties located anywhere on Earth.
A satellite QKD link will require optical pointing mechanisms compatible with the require-
ments of a quantum link—i.e., capable of preserving the quantum information while maximiz-
ing the average transmission (but not necessarily the signal consistency required for classical
optical communication). Recent demonstrations of QKD using moving transmitters [22, 23]
imitate the case of a transmitting satellite platform, albeit without a traveling platform reaching
the angular speed of a low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite. In contrast, a satellite-based quantum
receiver is somewhat less complex to develop, and adds flexibility to utilize multiple different
source technologies, including attenuated laser pulses and entangled photons [24]. To show
the viability of such an approach, we demonstrate an optical QKD link to a moving receiver
platform traveling at equivalent angular speed of a satellite. Our demonstration improves upon
previous moving-transmitter-QKD demonstrations by employing a coincidence algorithm in-
corporating time-of-flight correction, implementing automated correction of polarization drifts
(including those due to the movement of the tracking system) incurred in the fiber from the
source to the transmitter, and fully conducting the post-processing steps of decoy-state QKD
necessary to extract a secure key.
Our QKD receiver (Bob) is located in the cargo area of a pickup truck driven along a road
approximately 650m from the transmitter (Alice)—see Fig. 1. The experiment was performed
at night to reduce background light contributions and avoid daytime traffic. To maintain the
link we utilize 850nm wavelength beacon lasers and CMOS cameras, in conjunction with a
tracking algorithm operating at 24Hz, at both transmitter and receiver. Over the link we transmit
intensity- and polarization-modulated pulses, implementing BB84 QKD with decoy states [25].
Simultaneously, the truck maintains an angular speed exceeding the maximum angular speed of
a typical 600km LEO satellite platform [24], thereby supporting the feasibility of performing
QKD from a ground station to an orbiting satellite.
2. Apparatus
QKD states are generated by a weak coherent pulse (WCP) source located in a ground-floor
laboratory in the Research Advancement Center 1 building on the University of Waterloo cam-
pus. Our WCP source produces photon pulses at 532nm wavelength through sum-frequency
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Fig. 1. Schematic overview of the moving receiver experimental setup with map showing
the location of Alice, consisting of the source (green circle) and transmitter (red circle),
and the section of the road that Bob, located on the truck, traveled (blue circles, one per
second) during the moving receiver tests. Signals from the source (located in the laboratory
on the ground floor of the building) are sent to the transmitter using an optical fiber. An
active laser-beacon tracking and pointing system is used to maintain the free-space link
while the truck is traveling, and a wireless local area network (WLAN) is used for classical
communications. The distance from the transmitter to the truck is ≈ 650m and the length
of the road traveled during the test was ≈ 80m. Map data: Google, DigitalGlobe.
generation (SFG), combining an 80MHz pulsed 810nm Ti:sapphire laser with a continuous
wave (CW) 1550nm laser that is intensity and polarization modulated using fiber-based electro-
optical intensity and phase modulators [26]. The resulting 532nm pulses possess the same pulse
rate and pulse width (≈0.5ps) as the mode-locked Ti:sapphire laser while having the same po-
larization as the CW laser. The benefit of using SFG to create 532nm pulses is that the short
coherence length of the 1550nm laser removes the phase correlation between the pulses (an
inherent property of a mode-locked laser) while allowing the use of fast and stable fiber-based
electro-optical modulators designed for the telecom-band.
The 532nm pulses are sent to the transmitter (Fig. 2, top), via an optic fiber, where they are
collimated to a beam with ≈10mm waist by a 1-inch diameter, 30mm focal-length lens. The
small beam waist was chosen to maintain simplicity of the transmitter (by not requiring large
optics), and despite the additional loss caused by diffraction, the total loss remains significantly
lower than that expected in a satellite uplink.
To correct for phases and rotations arising from the fiber transmission (which vary in time due
to both temperature fluctuations in the building and mechanical stress on the fiber caused by the
motion of the transmitter), the transmitter is equipped with a polarization characterization and
compensation system. We use a modified optical chopper where upon each of six open slots has
been placed a polarizer aligned to pass horizontal (H), vertical (V), diagonal (D), antidiagonal
(A), right- (R), or left-circular (L) polarization. Some of the closed slots of the chopper wheel
were removed to improve signal transmission. As a result, 50% of the signal pulses pass the
chopper wheel unobstructed, 20% are polarized (either absorbed or passed, with probability
dependent on the state overlap with the orientation of the polarizer) and the remaining 30% are
blocked. A beam-splitter is used to send 10% of the passed signals to a multi-mode fiber which
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Fig. 2. Alice transmitter (top) and Bob receiver (bottom) apparatuses. The transmitter pro-
duces a ≈ 10mm beam and includes a chopper wheel with polarizer films followed by a
10% reflective beam splitter with a fiber coupler in the reflected port, allowing us to to-
mographically characterize the polarization state of some of the transmitted photons. This
characterization allows us to implement, in real time using a set of motorized wave plates,
a compensation to the polarization drift of the states caused by the fiber to the transmitter.
Only the signals that passed through the open slots of the chopper wheel are used for key
generation. The receiver, which is mounted on the back of a pickup truck, implements a
passive-basis-choice photon polarization measurement.
is coupled to a single-photon detector. A reference signal is given from the chopper wheel at
each rotation to identify the position of the wheel (assuming a constant rotation speed between
each rotation). The proportions of detected polarized signals are assessed each second and used
to tomographically characterize the states at the transmitter. To return the measured states to
the desired H, V, D, and A polarization states for QKD transmission, we optimize a theoretical
model of a set of wave plates in rotation mounts, consisting of two quarter-wave plates on either
side of a half-wave plate. We then apply the optimized rotations to actual wave plates mounted
in motorized rotation stages.
With this, in contrast to other polarization alignment approaches [27–29], we are able to
compensate, prior to the QKD signal leaving the telescope, any phase or rotation which may be
induced by the fiber, directly applying a unique compensation solution at all times. Our system
can also compensate polarization drifts caused by other birefringent elements, such as glass and
mirrors, as well as (slowly) moving elements such as those in a pointing mechanism, provided
they are located before the polarization characterization. Moreover, given additional relative
orientation information, our compensation optimizer could also easily correct for misalignment
between receiver and transmitter frames. For our demonstration this was not implemented, as
the receiver frame was inherently sufficiently aligned to the transmitter.
The receiver (Fig. 2, bottom) consists of a 2-inch diameter input lens (100mm focal length)
followed by a 6.5mm diameter collimating lens (11mm focal length). A beam-splitter is used
to implement a passive basis choice between the H/V basis (reflected port) and the D/A basis
(transmitted port). The polarization measurement is performed using 10mm polarizing beam-
splitter cubes (PBS). An extra PBS (rotated 90° around the beam path) is added at the reflected
port of each measurement PBS to suppress noise. In each of the four measurement outputs, the
light is focused into multi-mode fibers (105µm core diameter) using a 1-inch diameter, 60mm
focal-length collection lens and a 12.5mm diameter, 100mm focal-length focusing lens. The
four fibers are connected to silicon avalanche photodiodes which detect the photons. The field
of view of the receiver is 0.02°. Given some work to integrate the optical elements in a more
compact form to minimize mass and volume, the simplicity of the overarching optical design
of the analyzer makes it appropriate for implementation on a satellite platform. For our tests,
the receiver platform is suspended on the truck with a small inner-tube and held in place with
vertically sliding metal bars and elastic straps.
The transmitter and the receiver are each mounted on an orthogonally oriented pair of ro-
tation stages, one with a horizontal (azimuth) plane of rotation and the other with a vertical
(elevation) plane of rotation. On each motorized platform, a camera and three beacon lasers are
included, allowing for the transmitter and receiver to each use the other’s beacon signal devi-
ation, measured on their camera, to control their motors. The pointing algorithm is based on
velocity estimation of the beacon spot on the camera and its deviation from a nominal center,
and adjusts the velocity of the motors to match the estimated velocity plus a proportional error
term to reduce the deviation. Both of these corrections are based on a weighted average (ex-
ponentially decaying) of previous spot velocity estimates, in order to suppress high-frequency
jitter.
3. Results
The size of the optical spot at the receiver had a measured diameter of about 12cm. Following
link acquisition, the total link loss at the receiver averaged 30.6dB, mostly due to geometric ef-
fects, with other effects—including atmospheric transmittance, detector efficiency and losses in
optical components—accounting for only 7dB of loss. We calculate that the geometric effects
contribute 12dB loss from diffraction alone (due to the small 10mm beam waist at the transmit-
ter output), with an average of 4.3dB of additional loss due to pointing error of the transmitter
and atmospheric turbulence, and an average of 7.3dB loss from the receiver pointing error.
The receiver pointing error contributes more loss than the transmitter because road and motor-
induced vibrations of the truck under motion result in increased jitter. These vibrations would
be absent on a satellite platform.
During the experiment the truck is driven at a speed of 33km/h, corresponding to an angu-
lar speed of 0.75°/s, above the maximum angular speed of a LEO satellite platform at 600km
altitude: 0.72°/s at zenith. The angular deviation of the motor positions, as measured by the
imaged beacon spot on the camera, is shown in Fig. 3 (top). Initial acquisition and stabilization
required approximately 4s following first acquisition of the beacon. The mean deviation after
stabilization of the link was measured to be 0.005° at the transmitter and 0.06° at the receiver.
The extra deviation at the receiver is due to the jitter from the vibrations of the truck. (A point-
ing test with the truck stationary showed similar mean deviation to the measured transmitter
deviation, 0.005°, at both parties.) Figure 3 (bottom) shows the angular velocity of the motors
during the test. Both the transmitter and the receiver averaged an azimuthal angular speed above
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Fig. 3. Beacon angular deviation measured by the camera (top) and angular speed of the
motors (bottom) during the 33km/h test. The reported deviation on Alice (Bob) is the an-
gular deviation of Bob’s (Alice’s) beacon as seen by Alice’s (Bob’s) camera. The increase
in variation at the receiver (Bob) can be attributed to the instabilities produced by the mo-
tion of the truck and and curving motion of the truck. The angular speed at the transmitter
(Alice) is more consistent, with only a small increase in the azimuthal axis (of ≈0.03°/s)
during the test. The increased deviation in the azimuthal axis at the transmitter (Alice) is
caused by the jitter in the mounting frame which can move more easily in the horizontal
plane than the vertical plane. Before 1.6s, Alice’s motors are not moving because she has
yet to acquire Bob’s beacon signal. The gray dotted line represents the maximum angular
speed of a 600km LEO satellite (0.72°/s).
0.72°/s, with the transmitter (Alice) showing a more consistent angular speed.
The time of flight (Fig. 4) is calculated from per-second GPS coordinates recorded during
the experiment, and is subtracted from detection event times assuming a linear time-of-flight
variation and extrapolating the position of the truck from the most recent per-second data using
the velocity, also given by the GPS receiver. We observe a time-of-flight variation of around
15ns/s. A satellite time-of-flight variation, which could be as high as 20ms/s near the horizon
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Fig. 4. Time of flight from the transmitter to the receiver calculated from GPS coordinates.
The time of flight changes almost linearly and can thus be effectively compensated using a
first-order (linear) time-of-flight correction.
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measured on a per-second basis and the counts measured on a 2ms basis.
(approaching zero at zenith, where the count rates are highest), could be corrected similarly,
but may require greater fidelity, e.g. a higher-order interpolation incorporating predicted orbital
positions.
Figure 5 shows the signal quantum bit error ratio (QBER), the decoy QBER, and the count
rate during the test. The count rate increases once the link stabilizes after initial acquisition
(which takes ≈ 4s), briefly reaching over 41kHz. Even after acquisition, there remains a large
amount of fluctuation due to the low pointing accuracy of the receiver, which varies outside
the 0.02° field of view of the receiver. Both the signal and decoy QBER decrease as the counts
increase, with a minimum measured signal QBER of 6.16%.
Intrinsic QBER of the source is the primary contributor to the measured QBER. We indi-
rectly measure the intrinsic QBER via the polarization compensation system, which measures
the polarization states arriving at the transmitter and predicts those states after the optimized
correction is applied by the wave plates. The measured QBER before compensation and the
predicted QBER after compensation are shown in Fig. 6. Before compensation, the QBER
varies around 10% to 13%, increasing over the duration of the test, while the predicted QBER
after compensation stays constant at around 6%. We conclude that the measured QBER at the
receiver—6.5% to 8% when the count rate is above 1000—is mostly caused by the intrinsic
QBER found at the transmitter, with the additional 0.5% to 2% owing to background noise at
the receiver. While the pre-compensation QBER observed during the 10s of data acquisition
did not vary wildly, the polarization rotation induced by the motion of the optical fiber can be
large and is effectively unpredictable. In addition, the observed long-term polarization drift was
significant, necessitating optimization prior to each experimental attempt. These factors justify
our usage of the real-time compensation system.
We examine the 4s of data where the counts within each second total more than 1000, effec-
tively applying a signal-to-noise filter [30]—a filter with finer grain could potentially improve
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Fig. 6. Measured pre-compensation and predicted post-compensation QBER at the exit of
Alice’s transmitter. The time origin corresponds to the start of the optical signal acquisition.
The polarization compensation system corrects the unitary induced by the fiber from the
source to the transmitter and returns the polarization states to near their intrinsic QBER of
≈6%.
the results, given the high-frequency fluctuations of the count rate (Fig. 5). Post-processing
steps, including error correction (using low-density parity check codes) and privacy amplifica-
tion (based on reduced-Toeplitz-matrix two-universal hashes), are performed after the transmis-
sion, and secure key is extracted. The measured QKD parameters are reported in Table 1. (For
details of our post-processing approach, see Ref. [31].) From these data, we extract 160bits of
secure key, not considering finite-size statistical effects. A longer link duration would be re-
quired in order to extract secure key when including finite-size statistics—to extract secure key
with finite-size statistics to ten standard deviations (a common heuristic [32]), a total of 13210s
of data at the measured system performance would be required.
Improvement to the intrinsic QBER of the system could drastically reduce this link duration
requirement. For example, in a similar system we recently demonstrated QKD at high loss,
showing an asymptotic key rate of 1.76Mbit/s at a loss of 34.9dB [31] (4.3dB above the meas-
ured 30.6dB of our system), while QBERs of <1% have previously been achieved in other
WCP QKD sources [28].
Following the completion of the experiment, modelling [33] showed that this QBER is
largely due to reduced purity, efficiency imbalance between the two SFG crystals, and devi-
ations in the modulator phase for two polarization states. This analysis was performed using
measured state data obtained from the polarization compensation system, from which we cal-
culate the purity and fidelity of the states at the transmitter. The mean purity and fidelity of the
states was found to be 91% and 94% respectively. Our modeling shows a significant imbal-
ance in the SFG efficiency, with one crystal showing a normalized efficiency of 70% compared
to 30% in the other crystal, a difference of more than a factor 2. In addition, the modulator
phases for two states (vertical and diagonal) show notable deviations from the desired values,
explaining the lower fidelities measured in these two states when compared to the other two
states.
Another important effect that increased the intrinsic QBER is the reduced purity of the state,
which may have been caused by unstable phase modulators, or unstable voltages applied to
the modulators, in one polarity—the states with lower purity, vertical and diagonal, correspond
to different applied voltage polarities than the states with higher purity, H and A [26]. Other
possible causes are spreading of the polarization components due to birefringence (given the
short temporal width of the pulses), frequency-hopping of the 1550nm laser, and noise due to
Table 1. Experimentally measured QKD parameters of the moving receiver test. The pa-
rameters are based on a 0.16ns coincidence window using data where the received counts
exceeded 1000Hz. The small window allows us to increase the signal-to-noise ratio (and
thus reduce the QBER) at the cost of reduced raw key rate.
Parameter Value
Duration 4s
Signal average photon number 0.495
Decoy average photon number 0.120
Signal QBER 6.55%
Decoy QBER 5.49%
Signal gain 5.86×10−5
Decoy gain 1.5×10−5
Single photon gain lower bound 3.72×10−5
Single photon QBER upper bound 5.85%
Vacuum yield 1.35×10−7
Average loss 30.6dB
Error correction efficiency 1.15
Raw key length 11477 bits
Sifted key length 5844 bits
Secure key length (asymptotic) 160 bits
Secure key bit-string 01001010100010101011
00100110010001111010
00011100000000010000
10000000101111101111
01000001110100110101
10010011000001001001
10001100100001111111
00010111101111110111
background light. Accounting for this reduced purity, our modeled states predict an intrinsic
QBER of 5.33%, comparable to the 5.35% predicted by the polarization compensation system.
The asymptotic-limit result of our experiment is sufficient to show the viability of QKD to a
moving receiver platform travelling at an angular speed of up to 0.75°/s. Of course, the useful
optical contact time to a satellite (within a single pass) is limited to only a few hundred seconds.
However, given sufficiently precise tracking, key extraction while accounting for finite-size
fluctuation is nevertheless feasible under this limited time [24, 31].
4. Conclusion
We have thus demonstrated the feasibility of using a moving receiver platform for QKD. We
constructed a custom pointing system, and used it to maintain a free-space quantum link over
which BB84 decoy-state quantum signals were exchanged to a truck traveling at angular speeds
consistent with a LEO satellite. Following timing analysis and post-processing steps, this was
sufficient to generate asymptotically secure key. With reasonable improvements to the system,
such as reducing the source intrinsic QBER, and the addition of a second-stage fine-pointing
mechanism (both of which are largely engineering challenges with demonstrated solutions)
we expect to achieve appreciable secure key bit rates with the inclusion of finite-size statis-
tics. Such improvements will also allow us to demonstrate QKD to a moving receiver over
longer distances and higher losses, completing necessary steps towards achieving long-distance
satellite-mediated QKD networks.
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